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Free agricultural trade in the Mediterranean area is a delicate matter which brings both 
shores, as well as different EU countries face to face.  Specially, in Spain and France the 
agricultural opening generates certain strain between the priorities of foreign policy and 
the demands of the affected sectors, as there is the generalised impression that such 
strain would generate important costs towards the agricultural sectors in both countries. 
The aim of this study is to quantify the magnitude of the effects brought about by a 
unilateral agricultural liberalisation developed by the EU regarding major agricultural 
exporters from the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea – Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt 
and Turkey. Those effects are analysed at two levels: the supposedly positive economic 
impact on the south Mediterranean shore and the competitive increase for the European 
producers. The results suggest that the size of such effects is important for the southern 
countries  as  much  as  for  the  northern  ones,  and  show  the  need  for  reaching  a 
Mediterranean agricultural agreement. 
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In November 1995 the Barcelona Conference agreed the settlement of a Euro-Mediterranean Free 
Trade  area  for  2010.  Within  this  framework,  several  association  agreements  have  been  reached 
between the EU and Morocco, Tunisia, Israel and Jordan. Free trade would only affect industrial 
goods as the trade for agricultural products is limited by the specific concessions established in each of 
the bilateral agreements for the association between the EU and the Third Mediterranean Countries – 
TMC, onwards. Such agreements stipulated the opening of the negotiations regarding agriculture since 
2000 and in them the south shore countries are predicted to demand greater access to the European 
agricultural markets (Handoussa, 1999). The case of Turkey presents some differences as this country 
has a Customs Union with the EU from which agricultural products are excluded at the moment, even 
against Turkish interest in getting more favourable conditions for their entrance. 
 
The matter of free agricultural trade in the Mediterranean is a delicate topic as the interests of the two 
shores differ, besides the fact that even the different countries within the EU show differentiated 
positions. The TMC demand the liberalisation of those products which have a comparative advantage 
– such as fruits and vegetables, fish, flowers and olive oil – but are reluctant to liberalise the rest of the 
products. Continental European agriculture – grain, meat and poultry, dairy products and sugar – 
which has a higher support from the CAP than the Mediterranean one, is interested in the deficit food 
market  of  the  southern  shore.  On  the  other  hand,  Mediterranean  agriculture  tries  to  minimise 
competition from the TMC. At a national level, governments struggle between the priorities of foreign 
policy and the demands of the affected sectors whose mobilisation capability makes them important 
political pawns. 
 
Communitarian markets opening to agricultural export from the TMC represent a clear dilemma for 
Spain. On the one hand – because of geo-economic reasons – Spain is one of the strongest promoters 
of the Euro-Mediterranean relationships and is deeply engaged at a political level with the economic 
development of the TMC. On the other hand, there is the generalised impression – especially in our 
country – that the costs for such an opening would be significant and would besides also lower on the 
Spanish agricultural exports, mainly. 
 
The divergence of interests seems to point to the need for an agricultural agreement of an economic-
political character in the Mediterranean area between all the country-groups involved. That is, an 
agreement between the EU and the TMC and another one within the EU itself (Escribano and Lorca, 
1999). 
 The  previous  positions  of  the  different  governments  and  the  European  Commission  itself  are 
conditioned by the lack of estimates regarding the size of the impact that the agricultural opening 
could imply. From a European point of view, the liberalisation would be justified by its capability to 
promote economic development on the south Mediterranean shore through the rise in agricultural 
exports. At the same time, this would generate a virtuous circle, which would influence employment 
and the sector income and would be transmitted to the rest of the economy. In this study we analyse 
the effects of this hypothesis for agricultural products in four of the major agricultural exporters from 
the south Mediterranean shore – Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Turkey. 
 
The aim is to quantify the size of such effects when facing a unilateral agricultural liberalisation on the 
part of the EU. Thus, neither its effects on European agriculture nor the effects of a hypothetical 
opening of the agricultural markets on the southern shore are dealt with. Nevertheless the estimate we 
carry  out  does  allow  us  to  evaluate  the  global  importance  of  the  impact  which  the  European 
agricultural opening would have on the European producers. 
 
Our results suggest that the impact of these effects is significant, especially in terms of export and 
employment,  although  in  some  of  the  countries  analysed  no  huge  increase  in  terms  of  GDP  is 
obtained. From another perspective, the results obtained point to the fact that those new agricultural 
exports from TMC would be an important part of intra-communitary trade of those products, there 
being a considerable competitiveness increase for European farmers devoted to the Mediterranean 
productions. 
 
The structure of this study is the following: Firstly, there is a brief description of the EU trade policy 
operation regarding agriculture with respect to TMC, and how this interacts with the multilateral 
commitments reached in the Ronda de Uruguay. Secondly, we present some methodological matters 
of the analysis, the results of which are shown and discussed in the third section. We will find answers 
to  the  questions  ‘What  is  the  size  of  the  predictable  positive  effects  of  the  European  unilateral 
agricultural liberalisation in the TMC analysed?’ and ‘What is the impact which the new flow in intra-
communitary trade of the affected agricultural produce would represent?’ Finally, the conclusions 
section sums up the major results and brings the suitable implications for economic policy. 
 
European Union trade policy and Mediterranean agriculture 
 
The  EU  trade  policy  regarding  agriculture  is  currently  in  a  transitional  period  moving  from  the 
productivity  protectionism  of  the  agricultural  policy  previous  to  the  CAP  reform,  to  the  greater 
liberalisation of the sector, which means such reform as the commitments contracted at Ronda de 
Uruguay. Moreover, the agricultural protection of the European Mediterranean produce is affected by the Euro-Mediterranean association bilateral agreements, which set concrete preferences and take into 
account the possibility of a greater flexibility on the part of Europe in this matter. 
 
Despite  the  liberalising  attempts,  the  CAP  is  still  limited  by  the  protectionist  and  interventionist 
passivity of the past, which are distinguishable by the use of heavy duties and, above all, by the 
mechanism for reference prices, variable rights and entrance calendars. Before the entrance of Spain 
into the EU, this system was an almost insurmountable barrier for the entrance of fruits and vegetables 
in those seasons when Spanish production would compete directly with the communitary one. Even 
after Spanish entrance in EEC, such a system continued being used until the creation of the Common 
Market in 1993. The efficiency of the system of variable rights – which came into operation when the 
entry prices were lower than the reference ones – was easily noticed in the Spanish case: From 1986 to 
1992  Spanish  fruit  and  vegetable  exports  rose  9%,  while  from  1993  to  1998  its  rise  was  60%. 
Although this is true, in the latest years the peseta was depreciated almost 30%, and the rise of sector 
costs in Spain almost compensated for the profit from competitiveness-price through depreciation. 
 
This mechanism made the exporters adopt an organisation adapted to their demands, the bulk of the 
export would respect reference prices and would not be punished by the imposition of variable duties 
added to the tariffs ad valorem. Therefore, the communitary agricultural protection indirectly drove 
the  birth  of  trading  offices;  monopsonies  of  a  public  character  that  managed  most  part  of  the 
agricultural  exports  to  EEC  which  appear  in  the TMC.  The  impossibility  of  competing  in  prices 
implied the management of the market through quantities. The self-discipline regarding agricultural 
exports prevented the TMC from rising their market shares in the Community, but it guaranteed an 
additional profit – in the form of higher prices than the international ones – besides a preferential 
access that was developed through more reduced ad valorem duties because of the conventional trade 
policy of the EU (Sologral, 1997). In the new Euro-Mediterranean agreements certain TMC products – 
for  instance  tomatoes  and  Moroccan  oranges  –  are  also  benefit  from  preferential  reductions  in 
reference prices. 
 
After the CAP reform, the European agriculture protection system is still complex, protectionist and 
very biased towards the imposition of administrative measures. Nevertheless, it must be remembered 
that the major support to Mediterranean agricultural production came from the tariff and not-tariff 
protection and from the returns to export, as most part of Mediterranean agriculture didn’t have a 
support  system  for  prices  similar  to  the  existing  one  for  the  continental  productions.  This  is  an 
important aspect because the agriculture agreement signed in the final record of Ronda de Uruguay is 
based on the protection tariffication, the tariffs reduction, the consolidation of certain minimum levels 
of  access  to  the  market,  and  a  steady  reduction  of  internal  support  to  agriculture  and  of  export 
subsidies.  
The new model for the internal support to European agriculture is characterised by the replacement of 
the  support  to  prices  by  the  support  to  agricultural  profits.  But  –  as  most  of  the  Mediterranean 
productions did not benefit from subsidised prices –they do not benefit now from the support to the 
profits (Massot, 1999). 
 
Therefore, these modifications – both external and internal – to the rules of European agriculture 
support mean a higher competition in communitary agricultural markets, especially for Mediterranean 
productions whose internal support level is very limited. Fruit and vegetables – which have been 
constituting an average of 20% of the communitary agricultural produce in the latest years – only 
receive 5% of the EAGGF so that their only protection comes from trade policy, which also tends to 
decrease in regard to both tariffs and export subsidies. In the case of Spain, this situation of lack of 
internal support and protection reduction is worsened by the existence of dates of entrance whose 
effects  are  clearly  uneven  for  the  Member  States.  Such  calendars  protect  northern  European 
productions to a greater extent when they do not hold equal consideration for the Spanish productive 
seasons which are much earlier and have to face competition from the TMC in low tariff protection 
periods. Moreover, Spanish exporter and producer associations have their doubts about the accuracy of 
the new protection system based on entrance prices (Pozancos, 1999). 
 
Concerning the TMC, they are against the new CAP framework basically due to two major reasons: 
The  noticeable  increase  of  tariffs  because  of  the  tariffication  of  the  protection  through  tariff 
equivalents and the erosion of their preferences against the rest of the world brought about by the 
multilateral reduction in agricultural protection. A third worrying element for these countries is the 
perspective of an imminent enlargement towards the eastern countries, which are very competitive in 
certain  products  such  as  tomatoes  or  potatoes.  It  is  important  to  highlight  that  the  TMC  have  a 
comparative advantage in typical Mediterranean products where they strongly support liberalisation, 
but  they  are  deficit  and  unable  to  compete  with  continental  agricultural  producers  –  grain,  dairy 
products, meat and sugar. In fact the TMC encourage these products through policies of extremely 
interventionist  prices  whose  removal  presents  important  political  limitations  (Louafi,  2000). 
Therefore, their strategy consists of protecting these latter sectors in the multilateral framework and 
pushing for the Mediterranean product markets to be liberalised in the bilateral framework – with the 
EU  –  because  they  are  aware  that  their  agriculture  would  not  stand  a  total  and  reciprocal  free 
agricultural trade, neither at a multilateral scale nor at a bilateral one with the EU (Regnault, 1997). 
Moreover, the extension to the reciprocity agriculture used for the industrial products trade is rejected 
by the south shore countries because of the strong unbalance of bilateral trade relationships (Akesbi, 
1999; Elyssa, 2000). 
 With respect to Spain, it can be confirmed that Spanish productions of fruit and vegetables have less 
protection than those of the northern European countries, as the import calendars protect in a higher 
degree productions in the period between June and October, while Spanish producers must face a 
stronger competition. This fact, together with the Spanish farmers’ perception of suffering a historic 
discrimination  in  the  productions  where  they  have  a  comparative  advantage  at  a  European  level, 
explains their being reluctant to a possible liberalisation of agricultural trade in the Mediterranean 
area. This is why Spanish producers refuse to bear the main part of the cost of a policy on whose 




The aim of the analysis is to cover the following aspects: 
 
-  To  determine  the  export  growth  for  agricultural  products  that  could  be  derived  from  the 
suppression –in five years- of tariff barriers which the EU imposes against the studied TMC. 
-  The settlement of the impact that such an increment of export would have on employment, 
production and the added value in each of these countries. 
-  The concrete effects on the so-called ‘sensitive’ products as they come in perfect competition 
with those produced by the Mediterranean EU
2. 
 
The model used only values the price effect that is necessarily produced at the tariff removal and 
which brings about a probable increase in the TMC exports to the EU. The model covers the reaction 
of current productive structure at the potential tariff removal, not entering into the possible reforms 
that would be produced in such structure when increasing the EU investment on TMC among other 
matters. 
 
With the purpose of developing a quantitative analysis, we propose a mixed simulation system of 
Input  Output  tables  and  their  stirring  into  action  from  structural  econometric  models  for  the 
determination of future values of the explanatory variables. The chosen model is based on the models 
of  Social  Accounting  Matrix,  widely  used  in  the  developing  countries  context.  Nevertheless,  it 
includes  the  important  novelty  of  the  dynamisation  of  results,  thanks  to  the  evolution  given  to 
employment fixed coefficients – number of employees by branch on effective production – developing 
from productivity evolution models throughout the available statistical history, together with the rest 
                                                 
2 ‘Sensitive products’ are defined as those that are subject to the application of tariff equivalents and correspond 
to the tariff descriptions of: fresh or cooled tomatoes, cucumbers, artichokes, courgettes, oranges of all kinds, 
tangerines and mandarin oranges of all kinds, lemons, grapes, golden delicious, granny smith, pears, apricot, 
cherries,  any  other  grapes,  nectarines,  all  peaches,  plumbs,  grape  juice  and  the  rest  of  fruit  juices,  fruit 
concentrates, any other concentrated grape juices or concentrates. of  variables  included  as  explanatory  ones  and  which  are  developed  in  the  section  of  the  model 
specification – added values, deflators, branch employment, salary evolution, marginal tendency to 
consumption, financial pressure, etc. 
 
The operative needs to carry out the simulation are the following: 
 
-  The prediction of the basic macro-economic framework of each country analysed. 
-  Determination  of  the  customs  protection  that  the  EU  exercises  on  each  country  and  the 
‘shadow tariff’ as the measure for an efficiently developed protection, even when there are 
certain months with very little tariff protection. 
-  Determination of export elasticity-price. 
-  Sector distribution of production, as much as final demand of such production. 
-  Effective production of each sector. 
-  Employed number in each sector and their evolution  in time. (for the main attached ones to 
it.) 
 
Now, the steps mentioned are briefly explained. 
 
The determination of the effects of a free trade area needs a forecast of the economic situation both in 
the studied TMC and in the EU. The developed simulation – given the chosen horizon 2000-2004 – 
rests on a situation which is very favourable to trade exchange between the EU and the rest of the 
world due to the important growth foreseen for the five-year period. In the simulation, growth rates 
close  to  2.5-3%  for  the  whole  Union  are  seen.  Concerning  world  trade  growth,  the  figures  are 
enormously optimistic for the period 2000-2004, with foreseeable figures over 6 percentage points 
every year
3. Regarding the four TMC subjects to study, the economic growth expectations set by the 
forecast institutions are also optimistic, pointing to average growth rates close to five percentage 
points in the five-year period. This forecast is even better for Morocco and Tunisia where they are 
accompanied by a moderate evolution of inflation. On the contrary, the evolution of the prices is not 
so positive for Egypt and less so for Turkey
4. 
 
The product categories included in the analysis are different for each country depending on the weight 
that each product has on the whole of the agricultural export from which we have selected those that 
stand over 3%. The only exception is that of fish and seafood in Morocco, which has been included – 
                                                 
3 To get the forecast figures of EU and World Trade, we have resorted to the model of MEDINA Project – 
www.uam.es/medina - which collects the consensus of several forecast institutions among which are included 
the IMF, the World Bank, United Nations LINK Project, the Economist Intelligence Unit, JP Morgan, etc. 
4 See reports and statistics that appear on www.uam.es/medina.  as they are a product group specially controversial for Spanish interests – although it only represents 
1.6% of Moroccan food and agriculture exports. 
 
Fruits are main agricultural export produce in all countries except for Egypt. Among the rest of the 
products we can highlight oil in Tunisia, sugar and sweets in Egypt, and pulses and vegetables in 
Turkey,  Morocco  and  Egypt.  The  so-called  ‘sensitive  products’  have  a  different  weight  in  the 
agricultural export of each country studied: They represent 88% in Morocco, 88.8% in Egypt, 90.5% 
in Tunisia – including oil – and 88.1% in Turkey. Regarding the absolute export volume in value – 
ECUS per year – of these products destined to the EU, Turkey is the most important country with 
51%, followed by Morocco – 36% –, Egypt – 9%  –, and Tunisia – 3% (See table 1). 
 
Considering the tariff protection level on these products it is essential to analyse the effects of a free 
trade area which involves agriculture because the different preferential agreements determine different 
protection degrees depending on the countries dealt with and the month. Facing the complexity of the 




Because of the existence of a complex mechanism for the tariffication of the products coming from 
abroad the EU, it is necessary to have the estimate of what we have called the ‘shadow tariff’ – term 
which allows us to understand the percentage increase generated in the imported good price in the EU 
according to the trade policy that the Community keeps with each particular country. 
 
Obviously, the customs duties differ for each country depending on the degree of specialisation in 
certain products, which are more or less punished by the trade policy or by the preferential agreements 
signed. Thus, firstly we can distinguish between the average tariff imposed on the product and the real 
one imposed at the entrance of such product in each case depending on the month it entered and the 
quantity exported. With that we could compute the equivalent tariff – monthly weighted average of the 
tariffs applicable according to the real exported quantity in each country. 
 
The obtained objective is the exact settlement of the customs duty value, which was really paid for the 
products coming from Morocco, Turkey, Tunisia and Egypt and included in this ‘equivalent tariff’. 
 
Besides this effect on the export made, the strong tariff to which certain products would be subject in 
those seasons when their entrance would coincide with the production in the EU itself, gives place to 
                                                 
5 Shadow tariff: estimate of the effect of real tariff protection as the sum of the tariff effectively imposed on the 
import made and of the tariff which – due to its level – avoids import in certain seasons. For more detailed 
information, see MEDINA (2000). such a competition disadvantage that no export would take place. Being so, the computing of the tariff 
from the exported goods that were assessed for tax is insufficient as the effective protection in some 
moments prevents from there being any entrance and thus, this direct sum cannot be made. 
 
The protection included in the ‘shadow tariff’ is especially costly because of the concentration of 
strongly protected goods export from the analysed countries, to the extreme that the EU is null in the 
moments when the protection is higher. Nevertheless, the climatic situation of both shores of the 
Mediterranean Sea perfectly allows the coincidence in time of the harvests. It could seem more logical 
to  attribute  the  absence  of  production  during  certain  months  of  the  year  in  North  Africa  to  an 
adaptation to the selling possibilities in Europe than to attribute it to a climatic or a production means 
restriction. With all this we want to highlight the importance of a Mediterranean agricultural economy 
whose potentiality is much bigger than what it could seem for a level and seasonality of production 
completely dependent on limitations imposed by the communitary trade policy – which will disappear 
in the case of the setting of an agricultural free trade area (See table 2). 
 
For  the  computing  of  the  export  elasticity-price,  the  Spanish  referent  has  been  used  as  standard 
example when there is an evident lack of data and they are of low quality in the countries we are 
dealing  with.  When the  estimate  of  the  elasticity  in  an  accurate  way  and  with  national  data  was 
possible, the obtained values have been used in the simulation. In the other cases, estimated values for 
the Spanish case have been used. In table 3 the estimated elasticity for each country are shown – 
blanks correspond to those cases where the estimate was not consistent with the country data. From 
this table it is interesting to notice that the agricultural elasticity-price would range from 0.7% to 0.9% 
for almost every category stated (See table 3). 
 
From a different perspective, the seeming productivity observed and its predictable evolution is a key 
point in the simulation made. For the computing of the agricultural productivity, the evolution of five 
variables has been considered: rainfall during the year, number of tractors, fertiliser consumption and 
percentage of irrigated land over the total cultivated land. The results of regressions made allow us to 
evaluate the elasticity of agriculture regarding these variables. Each growth point of the irrigated land 
on the total cultivated one means a 0.4% growth of the agricultural productivity by each worker. This 
is the most prominent factor of the five ones analysed – the rest hardly reach 0.1%, excluding, of 
course, the arable land that is the fundamental factor. Anyway, in our analysis we assume that water is 
not a limiting criteria for the Mediterranean agricultural production, as the production under plastic 
and (with watering by sprinklers) makes climatic conditions and the capital being able to cover for the 
lack of water resources the fundamental factor (Decaluwé et al., 1999; Rogers and Lydon, 1994; Luc 
et al., 1997; Tujil, 1993). 
 Results of the simulation 
 
In this section we present, firstly, the results obtained regarding export facing the hypothetical opening 
of communitary agricultural markets for each of the analysed countries. Secondly, we comment on the 
effects that such export increase would imply at a macro-economy level for the four countries. And 
finally we analyse the weight of new exports generated by the supposed liberalisation in the intra-
communitary market of the affected products. 
 
For Morocco, the results obtained with respect to the sensitive agricultural produce export mean 1.4% 
of the GDP – see table 4. For all the five-year period, our estimate suggests a total export increase of 
more than 27%. If we consider different product groups, the potential growth is spectacular for fruits – 
53% – and quite important for pulses and vegetables – 20%. In the case of Turkey, the rise in exports 
would imply 2.3% of the GDP – see Table 5. The most important rises are on sugar and sweets – more 
than 40% in the five-year period –, wine and fish – 20% – and seafood – 12.8%. For Egypt the average 
export increase of the products considered is placed approximately in 23% during all the five-year 
period,  meaning  3.26%  of  the  GDP  –  see  table  5.  The  growth  of  edible  fruits  and  pulses  and 
vegetables is of fundamental importance, with a percentage of more than 28% each one. The results 
for Tunisia in terms of export are the most limited – 0.4% of the GDP; table 6 – and confirm olive oil 
as the star product with an increase of over 80% during the five-year period, followed by pulses and 
vegetables. 
 
With respect to the results of the macro-economy simulations, they could be surprising as, in some 
cases, the effects of generalisation of added value are bigger in the second phase – effect included in 
demand – than in the first one – necessary increase in production to face the new export. Nevertheless, 
the creation of employment shows a contrary effect, as it is much bigger in the production phase than 
in the induced demand phase. This fact is linked to agricultural sector peculiarity because the degree 
of concatenation of this sector with the rest of the economy is very limited. That is to say that it is not 
a sector whose production ‘strongly moves’ the rest of the economic sectors, but it is very intensive in 
labour and, because of this, small rises in production are immediately related with important rises in 
employment in the sector itself and with scarce increase of the total AV of the country. 
 
When we speak about the effect induced by the demand, the creation of new disposable income for 
consumption are distributed in a proportionate manner among all the economic sectors of the country, 
generating an increase of internal and external demand which definitely affects the sectors in which 
the interconnections  are  stronger  than the  ones/those  quoted  above  for  the  agricultural  case.  It  is 
important to consider the strong restriction of the model, which conveys the generation of profit for 
consumption in the so-called ‘effect induced by way of demand’. Statistically, the marginal tendency to consumption as the percentage of disposable income for this is well known. Nevertheless, the 
proportion of dividends and other incomes coming from the production means owners must have a 
dedication to consumption much smaller than that to the income from dependent work. But it would 
be foolish to think that this tendency towards consumption on the capital profits is null. In the model, 
the creation of new profit assuming that the employment created in the production phase is exclusively 
by third parties can clash with economies where self-employment is very important. This fact gets 
special  importance  in  economies  such  as  the  Tunisian  one,  where  the  added  value  has  a  strong 
composition of gross profit from export. This fact could mean a certain undervaluing of the effect 
induced by the way of demand. 
 
As it becomes noticeable on several occasions along the simulation, the important market of black 
economy present in the agricultural sector hides the flexibility of real labour, which the official data 
rarely shows appropriately, and which – at the same time – makes the computing of the apparent 
productivity of the employment factor quite complex. Even so, and facing international comparisons, 
we can highlight the following differences in the number of employees in each sector to generate a 
million dollars of agricultural production in 1995
6: while in Spain the number of necessary employees 
is 33.5, in Turkey it is 315, in Egypt 343, in Morocco 457 and in Tunisia 305. 
 
In the case of Morocco, the effect of the removal of tariff barriers is centred on specific products and – 
in general – they belong to the so-called ‘sensitive products’. The economic simulation allows us to 
determine a 1.4% global impact on Moroccan economy – measured in percentage of the GDP – during 
the five-year period. In terms of the relative importance on the agricultural added value, it would be 
8.25% in the period. The number of new jobs is over 115,000, the vast majority of them coming from 
the effect of a higher agricultural production. 
 
The lack of updated information in the Input-Output Tables of Morocco recommends completing the 
analysis with the comparative study of the change produced in Spain since the creation of the Single 
Market and with the elasticity that our country presented on that date. If we make the sum of the 
increase of ‘sensitive’ agricultural export produced in Spain when the Single Market was established 
in 1993 – comparing the 1986-1992 period versus the 1993-1999 period – and we take that relative 
growth rate to the Moroccan export values, the study shows that the speed effect on the GDP of such 
removal of tariff barriers would be equivalent to the one produced in Spain with a time-horizon of ten 
years for the Moroccan economy. That is, we study the possibility that Morocco would register the 
                                                 
6  Being  aware  of  the  quoted  effect  of  the  measuring  complexity  of  employment  in  the  country,  regarding 
international comparison it seems possible to understand that ‘on bulk’ the weight of black economy of all the 
Mediterranean countries will be more or less similar and the use of the family to face the needs of production 
will be so, too. In the case of Spain, the use of illegal inmigration in the country would eliminate differences that 
could be supposed because of its relatively bigger development level. same  positive  relative  effects  brought  about  by  the  removal  of  tariff  barriers  in  Spain,  although 
enlarging the time limit for getting it. The results computed for Spain during the 1993-1999 period are 
extrapolated to the Moroccan case with a ten-year horizon. Under this assumption, the results are the 
ones shown in table 4. 
 
In the case of Turkey, the simulation shows that the effect of the agricultural market liberalisation 
between the EU and this country would produce a rise in the Turkish activity of an additional 4.4% as 
an accumulated effect in the following five years – measured by the total added value – versus the 
results without the liberalisation. The number of new jobs generated by the hypothetical agricultural 
liberalisation – around 23,000 jobs – is small for an employed population of almost thirty million 
Turkish. Nevertheless, the importance of this figure is bigger in the framework of Mediterranean 
agricultural economy where the analysed effect is concentrated in an exclusive way. From the results 
obtained, Turkey establishes a growing pace practically equivalent in the relative increase of its export 
to the EU of edible fruit and pulses and vegetables (see table 5). 
 
In the case of Egypt, the results of the simulation are very similar to the ones obtained for Turkey, 
with rises that would mean more than three points of the total effect distributed in the five-year period 
in which the simulation is done. Such increase has a poor reflection in the creation of employment in 
the country – here, probably very influenced by the lack of a definite statement about the agricultural 
employment in the country. In the described framework, the export growth would mean 3.26% more 
than the previously existing one. This impact would bring a rise in employment of approximately 
16,000 people who would have to generate – together with the rest of the employees and thanks to an 
important evolution of the agricultural productivity – a total added value of 0.75 points higher on 
average each year of the ones included in the simulation. The effect on Added Value would represent a 




With respect to Tunisia, we find that this is the country –of the four countries considered – where the 
weight of the agricultural sector is smaller in terms of GDP – hardly 5%. Rutheford et al. (1995) 
estimated that the effects of the Free Trade Agreement between the EU and Tunisia would produce a 
total profit equivalent to 4.5% of the GDP once such effects have been thoroughly applied – nowadays 
agreement  only  affects  the  liberalisation  of  manufactureing,  with  Agriculture  and  services  being 
excluded. The Tunisian agricultural economy is a strong generator of added value in the form of profit 
from the land property. As it has been commented above, the proportion of the Gross Surplus of 
Operation is extraordinary against the one from the remuneration of the employees as much as against 
the  consumption  of  intermediate  goods  from  other  sectors.  From  the  25%  of  production  that constitutes the intermediate consumption, the self-consumption in the own sector – 8% –, that of the 
food and agriculture industry – 6.5% –, the chemical sector – 3,1% – and the energy one – 4.3% – are 
hardly meaningful. The rest of the sector interconnections are all under 0.5%. As a result of this, the 
connection of the used model between employment and production generates a situation where the 
added value resulting from the simulation is scarce – 0.5% in terms of GDP and almost 10% over the 
agricultural AV – and, nevertheless, the generation of employment is very important – over 66,000 
new jobs (see table 7). 
 
The global result of the simulations that have been carried out stress the importance of tariff protection 
as an efficient measure for the export control that the EU could develop in the countries studied, 
especially in the field of the so-called ‘sensitive products’ – edible fruits and pulses and vegetables 
mainly – as well as on fish and seafood. The net increase of export would mean the entrance of this 
kind of products which represent 11% of the intra-communitary ‘entries’ nowadays throughout five 
years – 2.1% every year –; That is that those product markets would probably assume a change in 
suppliers practically equivalent to that quantity as it is not really believable that its consumption would 
increase much given the first need products we are dealing with. This situation gives place to the need 
to either protect or restructure the sector in the EU before starting the removal of tariff barriers. 
Obviously, the countries from the EU that are more affected by this potential competition are the 
Mediterranean ones. In the case of edible fruits, these countries represent over 63% of the whole of the 
inter-EU trade (see table 8). 
 
From the global results of inter-EU trade and from the export growth values for each product that have 
been shown previously for Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Turkey, the increase of competition for these 
countries in the products for which the simulation has been made can be calculated, obtaining an 
annual total of 2.1% for the EU. 
 
As  has  been  commented  above,  the  nature  of  this  kind  of  product  trade  in  detail  has  a  direct 
competition  from  France,  Spain,  Italy,  Portugal  and  Greece  because  the  products  of/from  the 
categories  we  have  included  in  the  simulation  obviously  coincide  with  those  of  the  typical 
Mediterranean agriculture on both shores (see table 9). 
 
Putting together the results for the whole EU, the most affected product category is that of edible fruit 
– 3.42% annual growth of the competitors. This category is still very important considering only the 
Mediterranean countries, although now competition for fishing is also very relevant – 6.36%. 
 
To sum up it would be important to highlight the following conclusions: 
 -  The so called Medina-Agro I Model – from which the conclusions presented in this study have 
been drawn – quantifies the effects of a liberalisation in the agricultural domain as a result of the 
proportional reduction of price that the tariff elimination would entail in a five-year period. Obviously, 
such a phenomenon is accompanied by others of diverse nature, ranging from industrial dislocalisation 
in favour of the liberalised area – with the consequent change in its production scheme – to several 
foreign trade elements – other trade barriers such as preference for the national product, phyto-sanitary 
measures, quality standards, political or budgetary impulses, etc. – just to quote a few. 
 
-  Thus, being aware that the study focuses only on one concrete aspect from so many others, we 
cannot avoid valuing its importance for being a safe and direct effect. Moreover, when quantifying it 
one must be especially careful with the calculation of the real tariff barriers, which we have named 
here ‘shadow tariff’. References to diverse elements highlighted in this study are frequent in literature 
where we have elements such as the tariff policy capability to determine the way and time of certain 
countries´ production. Concerning this, it is important to notice how our main assumption on the 
computing of the ‘shadow tariff’ has been to assume that the real value of the protection is that which 
completely eliminates the competition potential of the other Mediterranean shore, and not because of 
an incapability/incapacity to produce but because of not being competitive with what is produced 
inside the EU when the tariff barriers are so high. 
 
-  As the major result of the estimate of ‘shadow tariff, there is the figure obtained for the tariff entry 
of edible fruit, where most part of the so-called ‘sensitive products’ are included. In this case, tariff 
protection provokes an average price increase of over 45% for all countries included in the study. 
Secondly, the ‘shadow tariff’ computed for pulses and vegetables – which would be around 30% 
depending  on  the  country  considered  –  is  noticeable.  In  the  last  analysis,  the  effect  of  the  price 
reduction of the entrance of these products in a free trade environment breaks the existing strong 
protector mechanism. Therefore, we should not be deceived by the simple computation of the money 
collected through the tariffs of these products, as they have the same deterrent effect even when no 
tariff is charged, as shown above. 
 
-  The elasticity estimated for the different product categories are normally situated between 0.75 
and 0.9 points, although in some exceptional cases it is over one. 
 
-  It  is  important  to  stress  that  water  is  no  longer  a  discriminating  factor  to  putting  a  limit  to 
production in North African countries. This fact is due to the diminishing of the importance of this 
scarce element because of the important investments on piping and supplying of the environment??? 
and  because  the  step  to  greenhouse  growing  with  plastic  and  dripping  has  not  been  taken.  The production possibilities due to the application of the new agricultural techniques make it impossible to 
consider water as a fixed restriction to these countries´ future productions. 
 
-  The main results regarding export increase are the following: 
 
·  Concerning Morocco and during the five-year period analysed, export would have a total 
increase of over 27%. Dealing with concrete entries, the potential growth is spectacular for 
edible fruit, which would be placed at 53% in the five-year period. Secondly, the entry from 
pulses and vegetables would rise 20% and that from sugar and sweets 14%. 
·  In the case of Turkey, the most important increase is seen in sugar and sweets – over 40% in 
the five-year period –, grape wine and fish – 20.2% – and seafood –12.8%. 
·  Regarding Egypt, the average increase for export in the products considered is around 23% 
during the whole five-year period, that is, a growth of almost 5 points over each year values. 
The importance of the growth of edible fruits and pulses and vegetables – again ‘sensitive 
products’– over 28% each is fundamental. Similarly, the important growth of sugar and sweets 
is noticeable –16%. 
·  The results for Tunisia show an increase of over 80% for oil during the five-year period. 
Secondly, pulses would be the product with the highest growth rate. 
 
- The increase of export estimated represents a growth of direct competition for the EU Mediterranean 
countries´ productions. The export increase foreseen means over 11% on the present average EU trade 
of  these products  throughout  five  years, thus an  annual  2.1%.  Due  to the  nature  of the  products 
studied,  the  climatic  factors  shared  by  both  shores  make  real  competition  much  stronger  in  the 
Mediterranean countries, where the estimated export increase on fruits would be 5.4% of what is 
exported  now  by  France,  Spain,  Portugal,  Greece  and  Italy  to  the  rest  of  the  EU.  Concerning 
vegetables, the figure would be around 4%, being also relevant the increase on fish and seafood – 
6.4% – and that for living plants – 1.4%. 
 
- The results of the Medina-Agro I Model regarding impact on each country added value can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
·  The effects on added value for Morocco projected by the econometric simulation called basic 
allow us to determine a global impact on economy of 1.4%, measured in the GDP percentage 
and during the five years studied in our simulation. In terms of the relative importance on the 
agricultural added value, we are dealing with 3.4% in the five-year period. ·  For Turkey, the simulation shows that the effect of liberalisation of the agricultural trade 
between the EU and this country would bring an increase in this economy activity of around 
4% – measured by the total added value – over what there would be without this liberalisation 
as accumulative effect in the following five years and with a decreasing evolution. 
·  In the case of Egypt, the increase would mean more than three points of total effect distributed 
in  the  five-year  period  of  the  simulation.  Such  increase  has  a  poor  influence  on  the 
employment creation in this country, being probably very influenced by the lack of statement 
of agricultural employment. 
·  Out of the four countries studied, Tunisia is the one where the weight of the agricultural sector 
is smaller in terms of GDP – hardly 5% – and thus, where the comparison could seem poorest, 
as it is 0.4% in five years. Nevertheless, measured against the agricultural added value, the 
foreseen increase would represent almost 2% of each year value. 
 
-  The  employment  increase  generated  by  the  effect  of  the  tariff  barrier  suppression  is  not  very 
important in the country’s global terms, but it is so in local terms both for the EU and for the studied 
countries. The concentration of the affected agricultural production in the Mediterranean shores marks 
this environment as the most affected one, and as the reference for the relativisation that must be used. 
In this context and for subsequent research it is important to value which would be the employed 
population affected by this process. It would even be interesting to check if there would be an effect 
for the returning of migration to their country of origin, as the European Mediterranean agriculture 
depends more and more on North-African emigrants. They might be the most affected ones by the 
effect of the loss of employment if the creation of a free agricultural trade area was created. 
 
-  On  the  whole,  the  results  presented  here  are  not  spectacular  regarding  the  GDP  although  they 
become so after being conveniently relativised. Concerning each country, the obtained values must be 
compared to their total agricultural production because we are studying export growth rates that affect 
only that sector. 
 
- Finally, it is important to highlight the strongly competitive environment that the liberalisation of the 
trade with north-Africa would bring due to the enormous coincidences in the types of crops there are 
between them and the Mediterranean EU. Liberalisation measures in this area should go through 
compensation  schemes  and  the  restructuring  of  wide  coastal  zones  from  France,  Spain,  Portugal, 
Greece and Italy. REFERENCES 
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Table 1: Breakdown of each TARIC product category in agricultural export 
  TURKEY TUNISIA MOROCCO EGYPT 
Live animals  0.0%  0.1%  0.0%  0.1% 
Meat and edible offal  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Fish and seafood  1.6%  7.8%  9.1%  0.3% 
Milk and dairy products  0.4%  0.0%  0.0%  0.1% 
Living plants  0.7%  0.7%  0.3%  0.6% 
Pulses and vegetables  24.6%  4.5%  30.7%  47.5% 
Edible fruits  54.8%  25.1%  46.8%  4.0% 
Coffee and tea  1.1%  0.8%  1.3%  0.5% 
Grain  4.7%  0.0%  0.1%  1.4% 
Mill products  0.9%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Seeds and oil fruits  6.2%  0.4%  2.6%  3.1% 
Sugar  2.4%  0.1%  7.5%  42.4% 
Grape wine  0.3%  3.9%  0.6%  0.0% 
Oil  2.2%  56.6%  1.1%  0.1% 
Selected ones (in bold letters)  94.1%  97.9%  96.7%  97.0% 
Source: COMEXT, Eurostat 
 
 
Table 2: ‘Shadow’ tariffs by TARIC agricultural produce categories 
  Tunisia Morocco  Egypt  Turkey 
Fish and seafood  13.9  13.9  13.9  13.9 
Cut plants  7.1  7.1  7.1  7.1 
Pulses and vegetables  43.1  23.3  32.4  16.9 
Fruits  47.7  46.5  46.1  42.1 
Grain  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1 
Sugar  31.6  31.6  31.6  31.6 
Wine  21.2  21.2  21.2  22.7 
Oil  70.9  4.5  4.5  4.5 
Source: issued by the authors based on TARIC and Comext. 
 
 Table 3: Elasticity price of export 
  Morocco Tunisia Turkey  Egypt  Spain 
Fish and seafood  -  -0.81  -1.53  -  -0.81 
Living plants  -0.89  -0.92  -0.87  -1.13  -1.02 
Pulses and vegetables  -  -0.96  -0.76  -  -0.78 
Fruits, citrus or melon peel  -0.96  -  -  -0.56  -0.56 
Seeds and oil fruits  -0.86  -  -0.9  -0.7  -0.89 
Sugar and sweets  -1.36  -  -1.21  -1.06  -0.33 
Grape wine  -  -  -  -  -0.72 
Oil  -  -1.43  -  -  -0.87 
Source: issued by the authors 
 
Table 4: Impact on Morocco 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  TOTAL 
D  EXPORT  333  683  1,052  1,441  1,851  5,360 
          % D EXP / GDP  0.10%  0.19%  0.28%  0.37%  0.46%  1.40% 
             
TOTAL EMPLOYMENT  7,603  15,234  22,967  30,833  38,901  115,538 
    Production employment  6,625  13,302  20,069  26,960  34,008  100,964 
    Demand employment  979  1,932  2,898  3,872  4,893  14,574 
             
TOTAL AV  355  727  1,118  1,530  1,964  5,694 
     AV Production  306  628  967  1,324  1,700  4,925 
     AV Demand  49  99  151  206  264  769 
      % D  AV /GDP  0.10%  0.20%  0.30%  0.39%  0.49%  - 
      % D AV/ AV agricult.  0.60%  1.14%  1.67%  2.18%  2.68%  - 
             
MOROCCO GDP  342,935  357,975  373,015  388,055  403,096  - 
AV Agriculture  59,103,30  63,965,18  67,103,70  70,242,22  73,380,74  - 
AV Ag / GDP  17.20%  17.90%  18.00%  18.10%  18.20%  - 
(Million Dirham and %) 
 
 Table 5: Impact on Turkey 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  TOTAL 
D  EXPORT  518,207  527,152  536,449  546,119  556,187  2,684,114 
          % D EXP / GDP  0.60%  0.50%  0.40%  0.40%  0.40%  2.30% 
             
TOTAL EMPLOYMENT  6,278  5,255  4,377  3,937  3,535  23,382 
   Employment Production  3,769  3,300  2,968  2,720  2,529  15,286 
   Employment Demand  2,508  1,956  1,409  1,217  1,006  8,096 
             
TOTAL AV  1,131,475  1,072,666  971,912  956,792  921,396  5,054,241 
     AV Production  503,335  512,023  521,053  530,445  540,224  2,607,080 
     AV Demand  628,140  560,643  450,860  426,347  381,171  2,447,161 
      % D  AV /GDP  1.30%  1.00%  0.80%  0.70%  0.60%  - 
      % D AV/ AV agricult.  8.10%  6.40%  5.00%  4.30%  3.70%  - 
             
GDP TURKEY  86,538,058  103,691,043  120,844,029  137,997,014  155,149,999  - 
AV Agriculture  13,961,783  16,707,341  19,452,900  22,198,458  24,944,017  - 
AV Ag / GDP  16.13%  16.11%  16.10%  16.09%  16.08%  - 
(Billion Turkish Pounds and %) 
 
Table 6: Impact on Egypt 
  2,000  2,001  2,002  2,003  2,004  TOTAL 
D  EXPORT  2,336  2,448  2,566  2,690  2,820  12,859 
          % D EXP / GDP  0.73%  0.70%  0.70%  0.60%  0.60%  3.26% 
             
TOTAL EMPLOYMENT  3,016  3,161  3,318  3,489  3,662  16,645 
    Employment Production  2,567  2,691  2,820  2,956  3,099  14,133 
    Employment Demand  449  470  498  533  562  2,512 
             
TOTAL AV  2,728  2,858  3,002  3,161  3,318  15,068 
     AV Production  2,178  2,282  2,392  2,508  2,629  11,990 
     AV Demand  550  576  610  653  689  3,078 
      % D  VA /GDP  0.9%  0.8%  0.8%  0.7%  0.7%  - 
      % D AV/ AV agricult  4.9%  4.6%  4.4%  4.2%  3.9%  - 
             
GDP EGYPT  318,075  355,926  394,721  439,193  489,066  - 
AV Agriculture  55,245  61,874  68,474  75,702  84,483  - 
AV Ag / GDP  17.40%  17.40%  17.30%  17.20%  17.30%  - 
(Million Egyptian Pound and %) 
 
 
Table 7: Impact on Tunisia   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  TOTAL 
D  EXPORT  51  57  64  71  80  322 
          % D EXP / GDP  0.10%  0.10%  0.10%  0.10%  0.10%  0.40% 
             
TOTAL EMPLOYMENT  10,786  11,736  13,159  14,543  16,386  66,610 
    Employment Production  10,431  11,362  12,745  14,092  15,884  64,513 
    Employment Demand  354  374  415  451  502  2.097 
             
TOTAL AV  61  68  76  85  96  386 
     AV Production  58  65  72  81  91  367 
     AV Demand  3  3  4  4  5  19 
      % D  AV /GDP  0.10%  0.10%  0.10%  0.10%  0.10%  - 
      % D AV/ AV agricult  1.80%  1.90%  1.90%  2.00%  2.10%  - 
             
GDP TUNISIA  62,517  67,718  73,231  78,949  84,873  - 
AV Agriculture  3,420  3,669  3,923  4,187  4,458  - 
AV Ag / GDP  5.50%  5.40%  5.40%  5.30%  5.30%  - 
(Million Dinars and %) 
Table 8: Inter-EU trade breakdown represented by the Mediterranean countries in 1999 
  SPAIN  FRANCE GREECE ITALY PORTUGAL TOTAL average 
Fish and seafood  11.2%  9.5%  3.0%  3.2%  2.3%  29.1% 
Living plants  3.5%  3.0%  0.0%  8.2%  0.3%  15.0% 
Pulses and vegetable  26.0%  13.6%  0.8%  7.1%  0.6%  48.2% 
Edible fruits  30.7%  12.6%  3.0%  16.8%  0.4%  63.5% 
 
Table 9: Annual percentage that new exports entail for each product category 
  TOTAL  TOTAL AVERAGE 
Fish and seafood  1.85%  6.36% 
Living plants  0.21%  1.42% 
Pulses and vegetable  1.89%  3.92% 
Edible fruits  3.42%  5.39% 
TOTAL  2.09%  4.85% 
 
 